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FROM BLACK AND WHITE TO HIGH DEFINITION 
EQUAL PROTECTION* 
Seth F. Kreimer** 
During the last two generations, we have witnessed two successive trans­
formations in equal protection, one in the area of race, and one in the area of 
gender. I take it as my task during the next few minutes to speculate on 
where comparable constitutional evolution might emerge during the begin­
ning of the twenty-first century. 
In exploring this issue, I submit that, in large part, demography is 
destiny. Both the constitutional revolution in racial equality and the trans­
formation in the law of gender equality were conditioned by broader changes 
in the structure of our society and there is every reason to expect the pattern 
to continue_l 
Neither the constitutional issues of race nor sex are on the verge of dis­
appearing. Indeed, the issue of racial disparity in American society has 
proven more refractory than any but the most hardened pessimist would 
have predicted twenty years ago. But the twenty-first century will raise new 
challenges as well, and it is on some of these issues that I want to focus. 
Therefore, let me sketch three demographic trends involving immigration, 
families, and the aging of American society, and lay out some of the ques­
tions the trends are likely to raise in the next decades. 
I. IMMIGRATION 
America has always been, to one degree or another, a nation of immi­
grants. During the period between 1921 and 1965, however, restrictive fed­
eral policies cut immigration to a relative trickle. By contrast, during the last 
two decades, immigration has approached the peak levels of the early twenti­
eth century. During the first decade of the twentieth century, 10 million im-
* Seth F. Kreimer, Remarks given at a panel discussion entitled "Looking Forward: The 
Impact of Social and Technological Trends on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Law 
in the 21st Century " at t he Fifty -Seventh Judicial Conference of the Third Circuit, in 
Philadelphia, Pa. (May 16, 1997). 
** Professor, University of Pennsy lvania Law School, Philadelphia, Pennsy lvania. 
l. During the 1950s and 1960s, t he American constitutional sy stem began to wrestle with 
the problem of uprooting the Jim Crow system and beginning to address the legacy of slavery. 
The issues in the court s were prefigured and conditioned by the great migration of African­
Americans from South to North during the decades preceding Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U. S. 483 (1954), as well as by t he experience of the nation in World War II. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, t he constitutional problem of applying guarantees of equality 
to the status of women came t o  the fore in a variety of areas. Here, again, the constitutional 
issues reflected secular trends in society;  during t he decade before, medical t echnology began to 
provide women with unprecedented control of t heir reproductive capacities, while at the same 
t ime, women moved out of the home and into t he workplace. 
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migrants passed through Ellis Island. By the time the twentieth century 
closes, America will have absorbed 20 million immigrants in twenty years.2 
Even if we were to end immigration immediately, this would constitute the 
beginning of a social transformation. Today, we inhabit a society with a 
larger proportion of foreign-born residents than any time since the beginning 
of the Great Depression. In 1970, 5% of American residents had been born 
abroad; today, 24.5 million American residents-more than 9% of the total 
population-are foreign born.3 And immigration is likely to continue. 
The pressure of this new wave of immigration has generated three over­
lapping groups that are likely to seek constitutional protection. The first 
group, American residents who speak languages other than English, came to 
the Supreme Court this Term in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona.4 
To set the case in context, we should realize that, in 1972, American schools 
educated 250,000 children in bilingual or English as second language pro­
grams; in 1992. the number swelled to 2.5 million. Today, well over 10 mil­
lion American residents speak primary languages other than English. 
Arizona had, by voter initiative, adopted English as its "official lan­
guage." The Arizonan initiative further had forbidden its officials to transact 
business in other languages. This potentially excluded linguistic minorities 
from a variety of public services and information. The Ninth Circuit's deci­
sion in Arizonans, invalidating the initiative, had focused on the First 
Amendment right of officials to speak to the public in an understandable 
fashion. as well as the public's correlative right to receive information. It was 
informed by concerns that the members of the excluded public constituted 
constitutionally protected political and racial minorities.5 
The Supreme Court dismissed Arizonans on standing grounds,6 but it 
seems entirely plausible that the issue of the treatment of linguistic minorities 
will come to the courts again in the next decade. Twenty-one states currently 
have "official English" provisions in their fundamental laws and efforts are 
underway to adopt such provisions in numerous of other states and localities 
around the country. The New York Regents' recent decision regarding test­
ing in foreign languages, and the ongoing debate on bilingual education are 
likely to push the federal courts to resolve the tension between aspirations 
2. During the 1980s, legal immigration added over 8.5 million residents to the American 
popul ation. A comparabl e number of documented immigrants are predicted to arrive in 
America during the 1990s. Combined with undocumented immigrants, the 1990's immigration 
exceeds the 10 million who arrived through Ellis Island during the first decade of the century. 
3. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU. J'v!.-'.RCH 1996 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY: POPULATION BY 
CouNTRY OF BIRTH, CiTIZENSHIP AND YEAR OF ENTRY (1996) [hereinafter MARCH 1996 U.S. 
CENSUS BuREAU]. 
4. 117 s. Ct. 1055 (1997). 
5. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F. 3cl 920 (9th Cir. 1995). 
6. Arizonans for Official English. 117 S. Ct. at 1060. 
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for national unity and the claims of new Americans to inclusion as equals 
within the mainstream of our society.7 
The second group which is likely to seek protection from the courts is 
comprised of legal residents who are not citizens. Of 24.5 million foreign­
born American residents, only 8 million are naturalized citizens.8 If fiscal 
austerity continues to constrict public services and benefits, and if the em­
ployment market continues to tighten in some sectors of the economy, the 
next decade is likely to showcase continued efforts to use lack of citizenship 
as basis for excluding otherwise eligible permanent residents from public 
benefits. So, too, efforts to bar non-citizens from other economic opportuni­
ties may gain renewed prominence during the next decade, justified by the 
same reasoning. A generation ago, in Graham v. Richardson,9 a unanimous 
Supreme Court held that alienage was a suspect classification and barred 
states from discriminating on the basis of citizenship in the provision of pub­
lic benefits and most employment.10 By contrast, five years later, Matthews 
v. Diaz 11 held that the federal government was free to exclude non-citizens 
from Medicare, a decision justified on the basis of federal interests in restrict­
ing immigration.12 As foreshadowed by an insistent majority of the Court in 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,13 the next decade is likely to include re­
newed pressure to maintain consistency in the constitutional obligations of 
state and federal governments.l4 
Finally, the growth in the population of undocumented aliens during the 
years following the 1986 amnesty, to an estimated 5 million in 1996, has trig­
gered a series of backlashes. Most concretely, efforts to enforce American 
immigration laws by arrest and deportation have grown increasingly harsh, 
putting further stress on Fourth Amendment rights and rights to judicial re­
view. In California, Proposition 187, which excluded undocumented aliens 
from access to public services such as education and public health benefits, is 
likely to replicate itself in other areas. At the federal level, Congress has 
entertained efforts to revoke the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of 
birthright citizenship for children of resident aliens. A decade and a half ago, 
in Plyler v. Doe,15 a fragmented Court held that Texas could not exclude the 
children of undocumented aliens from its public school system.16 The plural­
ity reasoned that Texas' public policy threatened to create a "permanent 
caste of undocumented resident aliens" barred from the mainstream of 
7. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (holding San Francisco public school system 
viol ated§ 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by failing to provide language instruction to 1800 
non -English speaking Chinese students). 
8. MARCH 1996 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU. 
9. 403 u.s. 365 (1971). 
10. fd. at 383. 
11. 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
12. fd. at 69. 
13. 515 U. S. 200 (1995). 
14. !d. at 213-18. 
15. 457 u.s. 202 (1982). 
16. /d. 
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American societyY Proposition 187 and its clones will bring the issue to the 
Court again in the next decade, with potentially fateful consequences. 
II. FAMILIES 
In addition to influences from without, the reconfiguration of traditional 
family relations is transforming American society from within. Half of the 
marriages in 1997 are likely to end in divorce and unmarried parenthood has 
lost its legal, as well as much of its social, stigma. Between unmarried 
parenthood and divorce, the proportion of children in single parent families 
has risen from roughly 14% in 1970, to 30% in 1995. Even in two parent 
families, full-time stay-at-home parenthood and the "family wage" has be­
come a minority pattern. 
Single parent families are more brittle than families with two parents; on 
average, they have less emotional and economic resources with which to 
withstand pressures and shocks, and to take care of children. The state, 
therefore, increasingly is called upon to provide supports to bolster the fam­
ily structure and to intervene when that structure breaks down. As compared 
to even a decade ago, many more children today end up in the care of state­
sponsored institutions on a part-time or full-time basis. The state intervenes 
more often and more directly in family relations. And today, more children 
end up in the custody of state agencies. As one benchmark, the foster care 
system of 1997 houses almost half a million children, while in 1985, that 
number reached only 250,000. If, as some predict, the restructuring of the 
current welfare system drives a million more children into poverty, we can 
also expect the number of children in state custody to expand. If states re­
spond to the void left by recent federal initiatives seeking to decrease the 
preference for family preservation, the ranks of children in state care will 
swell still further. 
The breakdown of traditional family relations may have a number of 
constitutional consequences during the next decade. First, the courts will be 
called on to ensure the protection of children. In Deshaney v. Winnebago 
County Department of Social Services, 18 the Supreme Court disavowed a 
constitutional obligation to preserve the welfare of children against parental 
violence or neglect as a matter of substantive due process.19 For children in 
foster care, pre-school, or after-school programs, however, DeShaney does 
not eliminate judicial scrutiny.20 Moreover, the equality of protective serv-
17. !d. 
18. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
19. !d. at 195-203. 
20. Id. at 201 n.9; Brendan P. Kearse, Abused Again: Competing Constiuaional Standards 
for the State's Duty to Protect Foster Children, 29 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 38 5, 390 (1996); see 
also Barbara E. Armacost, Af irmative Duties, Systemic Harms and the Due Process Clause. 94 
MICH. L. REv. 982 (1996) (criticizing DeShaney holding). 
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ices remains a constitutional issue after DeShaney.21 Both opinions arc im­
portant; because, particularly for the 20% of American children who live in 
poverty, often there will be no voice of authority to speak for children except 
the courts.22 
Second, the courts will be called upon to protect the family. A genera­
tion ago, the Warren and Burger courts successively established constitu­
tional limits on the authority of the state to interfere with the relations of 
traditional nuclear families, of extended families,23 and of unmarried par­
ents.24 The current Court shows no signs of retreating from those limits. 
This Term, in M. L. B. v. S. L.J. ,25 a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg 
invalidated a Mississippi transcript fee requirement that effectively barred 
indigents from appealing terminations of their parental rights.20 The opinion 
used doctrines of equal protection dating from the Warren Court era to es­
tablish a mother's right to "defend against the State's destruction of her fam­
ily bonds, and to resist the brand associated with a parental unfitness 
adjudication" despite her indigence.27 
As families dissolve and reconfigure under contemporary economic and 
social pressures, we are likely to see more plaintiffs seeking to invoke consti­
tutional protection from states' efforts to force family relations into politi­
cally acceptable pattems. The most prominent, though perhaps not the most 
prevalent, of these issues is likely to focus on the state's treatment of family 
members who are gay or lesbian. 
Last Term, in Romer v. Evans,28 the same six member M.L.B. majority 
struck down a Colorado state constitutional amendment depriving gay and 
lesbian citizens of access to all protection under state and local human rights 
law.29 Romer is a notoriously opaque case, representing anything from the 
21. 489 U. S. at 197 n . 3; cf. Nabozny v. Podlesn y, 92 F. 3d 446, 457-58 (7th Cir. 1996) (fin din g 
school's refusal to protect gay student actionable). But see Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, JOSS 
(1st Cir. 1997) (fin ding refusal to prosecute viol ence against women n ot action able). 
22. Likewise, with the witherin g of f amilies and other in termediate in stitutions. schools 
emerge as more an d more crucial f actors in shaping life chances. It would be n o  surprise to 
observe a resurgence of efforts to address in equalities in education , although state con stitution al 
guarantees of equality are likely to be more fruitful lines of in quiry for plain tiffs. See, e.g., Peter 
Enrich, Leaving £quo/icy Behind: New Directions in Schoof Finance Reform , 48 VAND. L. REv. 
101 (1995) (suggestin g education fun ding debate should be issue of adequacy an d n ot equality): 
Stewart G. Pollock, The An of Judging, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 591 (1996) (reviewing New Jersey's 
experien ce with judicially mandate d school fin ance reform); William E. Thro, Judicial Ana(vsis 
During 1he Third Wave of Schoof Finance Litigation: The Massachuserts Decision as a Model, 35 
B.C. L. REv. 597 (1994) (exploring "third wave" of school finance system); William F. Dietz. 
Note. !Vlanageable Adequacy Standards in Education Reform Liligation, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1193 
(1996) (discussin g education reform in state courts). 
23. Moore v. City of East Clevelan d, 431 U. S. 494 (1977). 
24. Stanley v. Ill in ois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972). 
25. 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996). 
26. !d. at 558. 
27. !d. 
28. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). 
29. /d. at 1629. 
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Court's germinating recognition of social hostility to gays and lesbians as con­
stitutionally invidious, to a broader skepticism of voter initiatives which sin­
gle out a status-based "solitary class" for exclusion from important state 
benefits. 
In light of Romer, we are also likely to see an emerging line of constitu­
tional litigation regarding efforts directed against families of gays and lesbi­
ans. On one hand, in states where gay and lesbian parents cannot adopt, or 
are deprived of parental rights because of their sexual orientation, Romer 
will ground challenges to these policies. On the other hand, whether or not 
Hawaii's same-sex marriage initiative survives,30 we can safely predict that 
some same-sex relationships will be granted legal status in some states, just as 
a number of states presently use second-parent adoptions or joint custody to 
protect parental relationships in gay and lesbian families. When such particu­
lar state sanctioned families migrate to another state, we are likely to see 
constitutional challenges to the new state's refusal to recognize the legal sta­
tus of those families. 
III. AGING 
The third demographic trend that will shape the twenty-first century will 
be the aging of the American population. On one front, this is simply a func­
tion of the size of age cohorts. In 1970, 20 million Americans were age sixty­
five or older-10% of the population. Today, the number has grown to 35 
million, or 12%. By the time the bulk of the baby-boom population hits re­
tirement age in 2020, 58 million Americans or more are likely to be sixty-five 
or older, a proportion that will represent almost 20% of the American popu­
lation. Not only will there be more elderly Americans, but the elderly are 
likely to live longer. Twenty years ago, only .7% of Americans, or 1.4 mil­
lion, were eighty-five years or older. Today, this group has more than 
doubled, to 3.8 million, or 1.4%, and that number, as well as the proportion 
of the population, is likely to double again during the next fifteen years. 
These trends likely will spawn a number of constitutional issues.31 We 
clearly can expect that the health care needs for this group likely will grow 
out of proportion to the group's numbers. On average, individuals over 
sixty-five consume health care resources at a rate three times that of adults in 
the twenty-five to fifty bracket. Moreover, the biomedical revolution contin­
ues to expand the health care that is technically available. In 1972, for exam­
ple, 14,000 heart by-pass operations were performed annually in the United 
States. By 1992, there were over 400,000 such operations performed. There 
is every reason to believe that the growth of other medical treatment during 
30. Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV.A.9l-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct . Dec. 3, 
1996) (h olding t hat Hawaii fail ed to prove compel l ing state interest in denying marriage l icense 
t o  same-sex couple). 
31. The expectat ions of an aging societ y are also l ikel y t o  spur further easing of rest rictions 
on immigration as a way of providing additional employees t o  a work-force that is not being 
replaced by biological means. 
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the next decade and a half will be equally expansive. Thus, by the first dec­
ade of the next century, we are likely to be faced with a huge demand for life­
extending medical expenditures from a group that is moving out of the work­
force, a group with a vastly increasing need for long-term care. 
If, as seems likely, government continues to step in to meet only part of 
the funding need, the courts will review a public system that effectively ra­
tions life-saving medical care. Already, some lower courts are beginning to 
impose procedural limitations on the denial of care by publicly financed man­
aged care entities.32 For a generation, the equal protection clause has been 
read to prohibit states from excluding from health care migrants from other 
states.:n ln a polarized politics of scarcity, it is easy to imagine calls for con­
stitutional intervention in the likely emerging system of health care rationing. 
A second possible constitutional conflict arises from the fact that the 
diseases characteristic of the aging are not acute, but chronic. Old age is thus 
likely to bring not only increased medical needs, but increased disabilities 
and suffering. With an ever growing proportion of the population both suffer­
ing and medically needy, there will be the temptation to convince this aging 
population to end its life, and thus end its drain on the economic system. 
Already, last Term, the Supreme Court confronted whether states may pro­
hibit physician-assisted suicide, even though states allow voluntary termina­
tion of life support.34 The Court rejected constitutional objections to this 
policy, holding that a state may distinguish between competent refusal of 
treatment and requests for assisted suicide. The issue during the next twenty 
years, however, will likely not be whether the state may forbid assisted sui­
cide, but whether the state may selectively encourage it. Indeed, when we 
recognize that among the hugely expanding group of Americans age eighty­
five and older, Alzheimer's and other dementias are likely to be highly preva­
lent, the question of what protections will be provided to impaired or institu­
tionalized citizens becomes crucial. 
IV. HIGH DEFINITION EQUAL PROTECTION? 
The predominant equal protection doctrine with which we enter the 
twenty-first century has been a doctrine in black and white characterized by a 
bifurcation between the deferential "rational basis scrutiny" and "strict or 
heightened" scrutiny of "suspect classifications" of race and gender. This 
32. E.g., Catanzano v. Dowling, 60 F.3d 113, 119-20 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding decisions by 
certified home health agencies denying services constitute "state actions" requiring procedural 
due process); Grijalva v. Shalala, 946 F. Supp. 747, 753 (D. Ariz. 1996) (stating Medicare HMO 
decision denying services is "state action" requiring procedural due process). 
33. E.g .. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974) (ruling Arizona's 
residency requirement as pre-condition to indigent receipt of county-paid health care violates 
Equal Protection). 
34. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1997) (holding New York prohibition against 
assisted suicide not violative of Equal Protection); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 225S. 
2275 (1997) (finding no liberty interest in assisted suicide and Washington state ban on assisted 
suicide "rationally related" to legitimate state interest). 
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scheme has proved barely sufficient to meet contemporary issues; it seems 
unlikely to prove adequate to meet the emerging social stresses of the next 
generation. Just as our television programs have moved from the black and 
white of the 1950s, through the color programs of the 1970s, to the High 
Definition TV of today, as we enter the next millennium, the challenge for 
the courts will be to move from the black and white deference of "rational 
basis" or "strict scrutiny," toward a High Definition Equal Protection doc­
trine for the 21st century. 
